INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses itself to the issue of 'market disruption' and suggests schemes for compensating the less developed countries (LDCs) who face (what may aptly be described as) 'export market disruption' when the importing, developed countries (DCs) invoke protective devices, such as 'voluntary' export restraints, to assist domestic industries seeking relief from foreign competition.
Section I deals with the problem of defining market disruption.
Section II considers the GATT Article XIX on the subject and its relationship to national legislations. In light of this, Section III considers the principal forms in which market-disruption-related restrictions have been invoked, focusing then on 'voluntary' export restraints (VERs) and the more sustained and formal multilateral arrangements (i.e. the LTA which restricts the exports of textiles). Section IV then discusses the welfareimpact of the possibility of market-disruptioninduced restrictions which LDCs face on their exports of manufactures. Section V then assesses the need for compensation that the welfare losses to LDCs imply from this analysis and, in light of this, develops specific proposals for such compensation.
Section VI suggests ways in which the GATT Article XIX could be modified to implement these suggestions.
Appendix I contains a brief review of one precedent,
where the 'importing' country provided compensation to the 'exporting' country for 'export market disruption', so to speak. This is the case of the United States compensating Turkey for adjustment assistance to Turkish poppy farmers (the objective being to enable the farmers to shift to non-poppy farming at no loss). Appendix II, on the other hand, is a theoretical exercise, in a generalequilibrium framework, of the phenomena of export market disruption and provides the necessary analytical support to the compensation schemes discussed in the text of the paper.
I. THE CONCEPT OF MARKET DISRUPTION
In a basic sense, market disruption is an old, protectionist concept: imports are considered disruptive of the domestic industry in the domestic market and hence must be curtailed and regulated. In this sense, virtually all imports are market-disrupting and indeed if one examines, in a 'revealed preference' fashion, the demands for protection by many industries in almost all countries, this loose and allembracing version is, in fact, what would most nearly reflect the intent of the spokesmen for these industries.
However, in an international economy which, in the post-war, post-GATT world has been geared to increasing trade liberalization, the institutions which have governed the use of protective devices for manufactures have taken a narrower view of market disruption. This is particularly true of the GATT, where Article XIX is designed to handle cases of 'serious injury' to domestic industries and is set within the context of other rules designed to constrain the use of protection by member countries. ' It is correspondingly true also of national legislations which were enacted to correspond to Article XIX and related GATT provisions. Under these legislations, for example, the successful invoking of protection required the public demonstration of injury, caused by tariff-concession-led imports, to the US Tariff Commission which would, in turn, convey its finding to the President who, in turn, could act on it, consistently with the national legislation and the GATT rules.
On the other hand, as we shall discuss presently in greater detail, the national executive has often been willing to sidetrack GATT restrictions and associated national processes for seeking relief under market disruption and to invoke measures, outside of the GATT framework, to regulate the flow of such imports. The most potent such measure has been the VERs which have tended to proliferate since the 1950s.
In consequence, it would be appropriate to say that, if we were to rank the different groups and institutions, seeking to define market disruption and to obtain relief from imports therewith, according to the degree of restrictiveness that they would apply to the concept, the ranking would be as follows: That is to say, the domestic industry, seeking relief from imports, would apply the least restrictive criteria to define market disruption; and the highest, in restrictiveness, would be the GATT, which seeks generally to minimize interferences with expanding trade. In between are the national executives and legislatures whose relative actions and attitudes on the issue of market disruption are likely to vary. Thus, in the United States, the executive has been, via VERs, de facto less restrictive in the interpretation of market disruption, whereas the legislative statutes have been closer to GATT, as noted above. On the other hand, this is quite consistent with the legislative representatives, interested in specific industries in their constituencies, being the effective moving force in getting a free-trade-oriented 'executive to enact the VERs. Hence one must distinguish between executive actions and legislation, on the one hand, and the executive and legislative bodies' attitudes towards the issue of market disruption, on the other hand.3
In light of the foregoing, it is clear that the loosest, industry-based view of market disruption would extend to all competition with imports in the domestic market and indeed no evidence of any serious injury would need to be established. Thus, as Metzger has noted, the provisions of HR 18970, the socalled US Trade Act of 1970, if it had become law, would have effectively elevated this view of market disruption to the status of the operating criterion for invoking protection (thus goins beyond what GATT Article XIX envisaged).
The escape clause would have retained a Tariff Commission investigation but reduced the definition of injury to one where the domestic industry's relative share in the domestic market had fallen, while also removing Presidential discretion in vetoing Tariff Commission recommendations for escape clause action. ' By contrast, Article XIX of GATT, as seen in Section II, restricts the 'emergency action on imports of particular products' to situations which satisfy three conditions:
(i) that the alleged disruption should have been the result of 'the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff concessions';
(ii) that the product must be imported in 'increased quantities'; and (iii) that conditions must exist which 'cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers'. While these conditions, and shifts in their interpretation over time, are discussed in the next section, it is pertinent to note immediately that the GATT envisions a much narrower interpretation of market disruption and hence a correspondingly smaller scope for invoking legitimate interferences with imports.
In keeping with this view of the matter, the associated national legislation has been relatively strict in interpreting market disruption as well. Thus, in the United States, the invoking of the escape clause has had to involve a public inquiry by the US Tariff Commission which had to apply legislated criteria, similar to those of Article XIX, to the case at hand: the US industries going the escape clause route have had to argue that concessioninduced imports were causing serious injury, and have often failed to win their case.
The invoking of protective devices by industries seeking curtailment of imports despite the GATT Article XIX and corresponding national legislations has therefore taken the route of executive action, typically in the form of VERs, outside of this framework; hence, the de facto definition of market disruption has turned out to be substantially closer to the importing industry's viewpoint than the GATT rules might suggest.
A review of the existing VERs, including the LTA governing the trade in textiles, reveals that the concept of market disruption that can successfully be invoked to get political, executive action in DCs tends to include the following 'weakly restrictive' features:
(i) There need not be a sharp rise in imports; it is enough for the relative share of foreign imports to increase sharply in the domestic market.
(ii) It is usually helpful to appeal to the notion that foreign competition is from 'lowpriced' imports. The Europeans have the term 'abnormal competition' to refer to this phenomenon and claim market disruption when, according to J. De Bandt, the import price is below the domestic price by 'the portion of value added which they are unwilling to forego'.6 This is a strange notion indeed for economists to contemplate: after all, trade will reflect comparative advantage and imports will be effected when they are cheaper than domestic output. But it is a notion that is widely held and presumably is occasionally successful in getting protection.
The reliance on criteria such as decline in domestic industry's share in the domestic market and the need to compete with 'lowpriced' imports have thus replaced the need to show that there is 'serious injury' in any other sense (e.g. that unemployment is rapidly resulting in the industry) and that it is attributable to increasing imports.
Hence the matter has become of serious concern to LDCs whose ('low-priced', 'lowcost') exports have now come fairly significantly to face the prospect of marketdisruption-induced restrictions and, indeed, are in some important cases (such as the LTA) already under such restraints.7 Therefore, prior to discussing the manner in which such prospects can be regulated and compensated for, it is necessary to examine in greater depth the history and present status of GATT rules on the subject, proceeding then to a fuller exploration of the growth of VERs and other restrictions outside of the GATT-and-related framework.
II. GATT RULES AND NATIONAL LEGISLATIONS
It is useful to put the current GATT rules on the phenomenon of 'serious injury', as applicable to market disruption, in historical perspective as also in relation to the rest of GATT articles.
It is fair to say that GATT has had built into its basic structure an asymmetry under which agriculture has managed to be relatively easy to protect but interferences with trade in manufactures have been made more difficult. Thus, for example, the GATT Article XI is explicit in ruling out quotas as follows:
1. No prohibitions or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, whether made effective through quotas, import or export licences or other measures, shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other contracting party or on the exportation or sale for export of any product destined for the territory of any other contracting party. Finally, the Article clearly states that the relaxation of commitments under it will be 'for such time as may be necessary': this, in turn, has been clarified to imply that while the expectation is one of short-term, temporary invoking of protection, the phrasing does allow for longer and continuous invoking of Article XIX.' O But, subject to these liberal interpretations, the scope of Article XIX is essentially narrow. Basically, it does require that concession-led increasing imports be a cause of serious injury. It also builds into the mechanism the possibility of compensation to the exporting member countries that thereby lose the tariff concessions that are to be suspended: reflecting, of course, the fact that Article XIX explicitly pertains to imports of articles on which a concession had earlier been granted and which is being suspended by the invoking of Article XIX.' l Of these two restrictive aspects of Article XIX, it is the former that has caused the critical difficulty for industries seeking relief from imports, by claiming market disruption, under national legislations. Thus, in the United States (until the 1974 legislation), for example, the escape clause actions (under the US legislations, noted in Section I) have been remarkably unsuccessful, as is evident from The result has been a rather limited resort to GATT Article XIX for relief by industries alleging market disruption; national legislations and processes, reflecting the tougher criteria of Article XIX, have eliminated the bulk of the protectionist demands under the broad umbrella of 'market disruption'.
The corresponding paucity of actions under Article XIX is therefore only natural and can be inferred from Table 2 which lists by country, the invoking (in terms of both frequency and commodity composition) of Article XIX until 1970. It may also be noted that the invoking of Article XIX has generally taken the form of an increase in bound tariffs and, to a lesser degree (in about a third of the cases), of the imposition of QRs.' ' Furthermore, it has been estimated that the developing countries' exports were involved in more than half of the developed countries' invoking of Article XIX. The restrictions imposed in these cases were removed within a year in a third of the cases involving developing countries whereas in half the total number of cases, the measures had been in force for over five years.
III. GROWTH AND EXISTENCE OF PRINCIPAL FORMS OF MARKET-DISRUPTION-RELATED INSTRUMENTS OF PROTECTION
Basically, therefore, national governments in DCs responding to the protectionist pressures from their industries, have responded in two principal ways: (1) by trying to weaken the restrictive nature of GATT rules on market disruption; and (2) by bypassing the GATT framework altogether.
Of these, the former has been the less important and has, in fact, not resulted in any major changes at the GATT to date. Apparently the first public reference to 'market disruption' specifically appears to have been made by the United States, via Mr. Douglas Dillon in Tokyo at the 15th GATT session in 1959.' 3 This was to lead to the appointment of a GATT working party in June 1960, to examine the issue of market disruption. Their initial efforts amounted to defining market disruption to include four elements 'in combination': ' 4 (i) a sharp and substantial increase or potential increase of imports of particular products from particular sources;
(ii) these products are offered at prices which are substantially below those prevailing for similar goods of comparable quality in the market of the importing country;
(iii) there is serious damage to domestic producers or threat thereof;
(iv) the price differentials referred to in paragraph (ii) above do not arise from govemmental intervention in the fixing or formation of prices or from dumping practices.
The Working Party advocated a multilateral and 'constructive' approach towards this problem, which would permit trade expansion. Its recommendation that there be a permanent Committee on Market Disruption was accepted and this Committee, in collaboration with the international Labour Office, was to consider Note: Further details on these cases, including dates of introduction, termination or renegotiation, plus whether tariffs or QRs were imposed, are available at the GATT Secretariat, in unpublished form. * Where a product had been subjected to more than one escape-clause investigation, we write the finding in italics.
Before discussing the scope of these VERs, it clause route first; this is true, for example, of is interesting to note that an analysis of the US cotton textiles in the US, now under the LTA! VERs, as in (5) to (4) (%) 11. Ratio of (7) to (4) (8) 1.2. Ratio of (5) to (1) (%) 13. Ratio of (7) to (1) (%) 14. Ratio of (9) to (1) Indeed, similar exertion of political muscle by industry and, in turn, by government against the exporting country were to mark the four early VERs between Japan and the US in the 1930s.' 6 Information regarding VERs is, by the standards of international trade data, occasionally difficult to come by: this is in the nature of the case, given the extra-GATTframework, political arm-twisting that precedes their incidence. Such data as are available for Canada have been put together by Henry and reproduced here in Tables 4 and 5. Table 4 relates exclusively to cotton textiles and shows both the specific nature of the quotas and the negligible growth rates allowed in them annually in nearly all cases. a. 1969 figure, excluding several categories of steel products covered by the VERS. Thus the figure for total VER coverage should be somewhat higher. In 1973, the total coverage approximated $2.3 billion.
Am~cles
WORLD DEVELOPMENT Thus, the early VERs on textiles from Japan, imposed by the US in the 193Os, were at a time when total imports of textiles into the US were no more than 3% of domestic production and total imports from Japan were only about l%."
During 195 l-62, straddling the renewal of such VERs in mid-1950s, the shares were, if anything, even lower. Similarly, the steel VERs invoked by the US have also been in the face of imports as low as 17 million tons against domestic production of 141 million tons in 1969.2 '
(ii) The industries profiting from VERs almost always allege fears of 'low-price' imports offering undue competition and threatening injury, rather than actually causing it.22
(iii) The length of duration of the VERs, at a time, would seem to be around one year but can go to as far as five years. In several cases, they have been renewed beyond the period of first imposition2 3 Some have been allowed to lapse as well, (iv) The VERs are an inefficient instrument, compared to domestic tariffs or quotas, in restricting imports. The principal cause is that VERs apply to specific exporters and they cannot effectively rule out new suppliers from entering the market. In consequence, the progress of most VERs on specific countries (with notable exceptions as in the case of US VERs on steel) has been towards increasing coverage of other exporters and, in the case of textiles, to a fully multilateral arrangement of exporters and importers.24 In other cases, such as Canada, there is 'back-up' legislation in case VERs fail to hold back imports effectively.2s (v) While the VERs build in permissible rates of growth of exports from specific countries, these are invariably controlled at low levels.-Thus the latest Arrangement on Textiles builds in a ceiling of 6% (as against the earlier 5%) but, at the same time allows for an escape route (seized under the earlier Arrangement by Canada, for example, at 3%) under which a 'lower positive growth rate may be applied '.26 (vi) Furthermore, there is literally no sanction against the expansion of capacity in the domestic industry of the importing country while the VERs operate. This is the case even for the 1974 Arrangement in Textiles; and, in fact, while the earlier LTA operated, the exported LDCs noted and complained about the growth of such capacity in member DCs to no avail. Therefore VERs are, in this respect, one-sided.
(vii) Finally, unlike the compensation possibility in the GATT Article XIX, there is practically no evidence that any of the existing and past VERs have incorporated explicit compensation to the countries whose export markets are being disrupted.2 '
IV. IMPACT OF 'EXPORT MARKET DISRUPTION' ON WELFARE OF EXPORTING LDCs
The threat of protectionist restrictions being invoked by the importing countries, on grounds of market disruption, can be shown to impose a welfare loss on the exporting countries, as is in fact done in the theoretical Appendix II.
It is shown there that, taking expected utilities, economic welfare of the exporting country will be less than if there were no such threat. It is also shown that if the exporting country, in turn, reacts with an optimal policy intervention in the nature of restricted exports so as to reduce the probability of VERs or other such market-disruption-related restrictions being invoked, then the reduction in welfare from the threat of such invocations will be less than if the exporting country took no such action: but the loss will still be there. And, furthermore, if investment allocations cannot be costlessly readusted, once in place, then the presence of such 'adjustment costs' will further increase the loss of welfare from the threat of such trade restraints. Finally, the actual invoking of the trade restraints would inflict a welfare loss on the exporting country that would exceed the expected loss from the threat of such an invocation at a future date.
From these general theoretical propositions, certain compensatory proposals would seem to follow.
(1) First, there is a case for asking importing DCs to compensate the exporting LDCs faced with mere threots of market-disruption-related trade restraints.
The DCs can reasonably be asked to 'buy', with compensation payments, the right to invoke a market-disruption-related trade restraint on a product, and to forego the right to resort to such trade restraints on all products not so bought for. Thus a list of 'restrainable' items can be prepared under multilateral auspices, such as GATT, and the compensation required for affected exporters, whose welfare is correspondingly reduced, would have to be paid to put a product on such a list. 
(4) Automaticity of compensation
The penalty/compensation would be automatic under the preceding rules, rather than constituting a mere possibility as in the current GATT Article XIX. This would rule out the use of political muscle to get out of this obligation when invoking trade restraints.
(5) Financial form of compensation Moreover, the above rules require financial compensation. This is in contrast, for example, to the Article XIX variety of 'compensation', which takes the form of either grant of a new tariff concession (on something else) or of withdrawal of a tariff concession by the exporting country.
This latter method reflects the tariffbargaining framework in which GATT rules are enmeshed; it makes little sense since compensation to the exporter in the form of enabling the latter to raise a tariff in retaliation, for example, presupposes that the latter is advantageous while in fact, it is likely to cause yet more damage by further restraining trade; at the same time, it disrupts yet another market in seeking redress for the original market disruption. The financial form of penalty/ compensation provided for in the rules suggested above is free from these obvious defects.
(6) Compensation to exporting country Furthermore, the financial compensation is designed here for payment to the exporting country, rather than to the exporting industry: as called for by the theoretical analysis of Appendix II. In turn, the payment is to be made by the importing country.
It may be noted that the latter financial penalty to be paid from the budget would, in turn, serve to generate executive counter-pressures against the industrial pressure groups for trade restraints, potential and actual.
(7) Compensation only for LDCs
The preceding rules in regard to compensation may be applied only to exporting LDCs. They are, after all, the countries which have been seriously affected by the textiles restrictions and by VERs, as we have already seen3 ' Further, there is greater willingness, as part of the new international economic order, to grant LDCs reasonable accommodation via framing new rules regarding their trade. Moreover, the flows of funds to be so generated are far more likely to be significant, relative to their needs, for LDCs than for DCs. Finally, discriminatory adjustment of trade rules, in favour of LDCs, is well-embedded in GATT reform, as in the enactment of Article XXIII for them at GATT.
The foregoing set of rules, involving essentially compensation for exporting LDCs by importing DCs, are not entirely novel in their reference to the potential use of trade restraints since the well-established practice of the 'binding' of tariffs indeed implies that the potential use of restrictions is given up. In regard to the notion of the compensation itself, however, there are no obvious precedents. However, a precedent of sorts, which certainly suggests that what is being proposed here is fully feasible, relates to the payment by the United States of compensation to the Turkish government of a sizeable sum in order to enforce the ban on poppy production: by using this money to compensate Turkish farmers, in turn, this would theoretically have made it possible for them to shift to other cultivation at no financial 10~s.~' This 'precedent' is spelled out in some detail in Appendix I. There would therefore appear to be nothing insuperable, politically, in putting the suggested compensatory rules here onto the agenda for GATT reform. At the same time, it would be useful to note that, in complementarity to the rules suggested above, two DC policies would be extremely valuable, only one of which is being gradually extended in scope:
(1) Insofar as the response to foreign imports, or to domestic decline due to other reasons, is to provide domestic adjustment assistance to assist factors of production to retrain and relocate, this will correspondingly reduce the need to resort to trade restraints by making the pressures for such restraints from the industry both less intense and politically less difficult to resist. In this regard, the easing of the criteria for such adjustment assistance in the recent US Trade Act of 1974 is welcome news for the exporting LDCS.~ * (2) Next, it is clear from elementary principles that trade restraint, to protect the production level of the domestic industry, is inferior to the use of a production subsidy: from the viewpoint of the importing DC itself.33 Equally, it is obvious that the use of the production subsidy will increase the overall market in the DC for the imported item while a tariff, by increasing the price for consumers, will reduce it. Hence, given the fact that domestic production must be maintained at a desired level, the use of a production subsidy by the importing DC will be preferable, from the viewpoint of the exporting LDC, than the use of a trade policy.34 Thus it would be useful if the overall reform in regard to the phenomenon of market-disruption-related trade restraints, as suggested in this section, were to include a multilateral agreement by DCs to use production subsidies rather than tariffs or trade quotas, whenever trade restraints are invoked under the rules specified above.35 The only exceptions to this code could include emergency situations where an immediate trade quota may be necessary: in this case, the quota could be phased out and replaced gradually by a production subsidy on a multilaterally agreed schedule.
VI. PROPOSED MODIFICATION IN GATT ARTICLE XIX
If the suggested rules in Section V are to be implemented, the logical place for them is the GATT; and there, the logical candidate for replacement by these rules is Article XIX.
The GATT is being already reexamined -as, in fact, it has been continuously since its inception in regard to new phenomena such as the growth of customs unions -in regard to the manifestation and growth of new problems such as the use of export quotas,s6 for example, to hold back commodities for national objectives such as anti-inflationary policy. The recent thrust towards a new international economic order also provides an ideal climate to re-examine long-standing issues such as market disruption which have beeh addressed but for which suitable solutions have not been provided.
The rules suggested in Section V above therefore provide an agenda for replacing the basic content of Article XIX, in an international economic climate where such a concrete proposal is likely to be examined without immediate hostility on the part of DCs. At the same time, in being concrete and specific, the suggested changes provide the necessary content and shape to the longstanding demands by LDCs that something be done about the phenomenon of marketdisruption-related trade restraints from DCs. They constitute therefore an essential and useful input into the basic agenda for reforming GATT as part of a new international economic order.
The formal adoption of such rules, replacing The dynamics of reaching an agreement on these rules, finally, would presumably have to involve an initiative by the LDCs themselves, as they are the parties that are injured by the current and potential market-disruption-related trade restraints.
The logical place for their initiative is therefore the UNCTAD, to be followed by action by the LDC members of the GATT at the GATT. 11. The Article builds in provision for consultations with interested contracting parties, which is the usual forum for granting the compensation if indeed granted. (Where the action is taken prior to consultation, the interested contracting parties may retaliate. However, such retaliation has been quite rare, having occurred only in three cases to present date.) Furthermore, as seen from Table 2 , and corroborated also by unpublished tabulations at GATT, compensation is only a possibility, as noted in the text, and is often not provided when Article XIX is invoked. In fact, dissatisfaction with the compensation aspect of Article XIX has prompted occasional suggestions to do away with it and instead modify Article XIX so as to insist on the following of certain stricter criteria by the country invoking the Article.
12. In some cases, the action took the form of establishing minimum valuations for imports, thus effectively raising the tariff rate for items with actual values below these minimums.
13. GATT (1961b, p. 25) . In fact, it was at the United States' initiative that Article XIX had been included in GATT originally.
14. Cf. GATT (1961a) ; also cited in Pestieau and Henry (1972, pp. 137-138), in Metzger (1971, pp. 175-176) , and discussed in GATT (1961b, pp. 25-26) .
15. Cf. Pest&u and Henry (1972, pp. 137-138). 16. Metzger (1971, pp. 170-171) . 'As Henry states, the "entire story shows clearly that the US-Japan voluntary export restraint agreements of the 1930s resulted mainly from American pressures and threats of unilateral, permanent, and possibly more restrictive action". "Nothing indicates", he asserts, "that this pattern has changed since". The Japanese, for their part, accepted the agreements as the most practicable means of preserving a portion of their textile exports to the United States, and in the interest of political harmony in this sphere of their relationships with the United States.' 17. Note that, ideally, one would rather examine how much trade is, in fact, inhibited at the margin by these VERs.
18. Note, however, that this list would include also VERs imposed truly voluntarily by Japan, without duress from the importing countries, in the interest of 'price regulation', quality control, etc.
19. Cf. GATT (1974) , Article 12, pp. 17-18. 20. Cf. Metzger (1971, p. 170) .
Cf Metzger (1971, p. 182).
22. It is interesting to note that the recent theory of nonequivalence between tariffs and quotas under uncertainty shows that if the uncertainty comes from foreign supply, the welfare-superiority of tariffs over quotas as methods of restricting imports to a given level is reversed if the tariff rate were high: precisely 100% in the case of linear supply and demand schedules.
Cf. the interesting work of Michael Pelcovits (1975).
23, Pestieau and Henry (1972) note that the duration of a formal agreement is not identical with its incidence; occasionally, as with GATT Article XIX as well, the restriction will go into force before papers are exchanged. They also note that most Canadian VERs have duration of one year.
24. Besides, export quotas have always been known to earn the monopoly rents (from restriction) for the exporters whereas domestic tariffs or quotas will earn them for the importer under competition.
25. Pestieau and Henry (1972, p. 168) : 'Several Canadian laws include clauses that can be used to supplement or reinforce VERs, and the various amendments enacted in the context of the present government's textile policy lessen the previous dependence on exporters' voluntary collaboration. Prior to January 1969, subsection (7~) of section 40A of the Customs Act was used to apply special values for duty in instances where imports were found to have injured the interest of Canadian producers. However, this subsection was repealed and replaced on 1 January 1969, by the new section 8 of the Customs Tariff Act. As stated in section 37 of the Antidumping Act (1969), the new section authorizes the imposition of a surtax on imports that cause or threaten to cause injury to Canadian producers of similar or directly competitive goods. The Export and Import Permits Act has also been amended to permit unilateral imposition of import-licensing quotas to deal with problems of disruptive imports whenever VER arrangements would not be feasible. Furthermore, section S(c) of this Act enables the federal government to control imports and "to implement an intergovernmental arrangement or commitment" -clearly opening up a method of making VER arrangements more effective.
These are the powers on which the efficiency of the Canadian VER system rests'.
Examples can be found in US legislation as well, as in the Public Law 87488 (HR 10788) which amended Section 204 of the Agricultural Act of 1956 by the insertion of the following sentence:
'In addition, if a multilateral agreement has been or shall be concluded under the authority of this section among countries accounting for a significant part of world trade in the articles with respect to which the agreement was concluded, the President may also issue, in order to carry out such an agreement, regulations governing the entry or withdrawal from warehouse of the same articles which are the products of countries not parties to the agreement.' This legislation was approved on 19 June 1962.
Note that both US and Canada have back-up legislation for VERs in cases of textiles and meat.
26. Cf. GATT (1974, Annex B, p. 22) .
27. However, from a theoretical standpoint, it may be noted that VERs, as contrasted with import QRs, will transfer the monopoly rents from the trade restriction to the exporters, so that one may well consider this to constitute an implicit compensation under VER arrangement. In fact, as Bergsten has pointed out, textile quota tickets are actively sold throughout the Far East at a premium that reflects this rent. See Fred Bergsten (1975, pp. 239-271) .
28. An analogue to this recommendation may be found in the practice of 'binding' tariffs in advance. 30. VERs have also affected Japan seriously; and, in some cases, such as the steel VERs in the USA, the impact was felt by the developed country exporters and imports were initially diverted to developing countries which thereby benefited.
The compensation
rules suggested for trade restraints in this paper, however, relate only to financial compensation to the exporting country, and nor to the exporting industry. For other contrasts, refer to Appendix I. 32. For an excellent account of the US policies in regard to adjustment assistance, and evidence on the efforts to ease the criteria for it until 1973, see Robert Baldwin and John Mutti, 'Policy issues in adjustment assistance: the United States', in Helen Hughes (ed.) (1973), especially Section IV. Adjustment assistance in the EEC is also discussed in Chapter 7 of this volume.
33. This is one of the important policy prescriptions from the theory of optimal policy intervention in the presence of 'non-economic' objectives and follows from the fact that the tariff imposes a consumption cost (by raising prices for consumers) which is avoided, while equally protecting domestic output, by a production subsidy. Cf. J. Bhagwati and T. N. Srinivasan (1969) .
34. This conclusion would have to be modified, but is not altogether nullified, if the domestic industry wishes to maintain a certain share of sales in the domestic market. The optimal policy intervention in this case, from the DC viewpoint, would be the combination of an import tariff and a production subsidy.
35. A code of conduct, along these lines, is mentioned also by Henry, op. cit., p. 175, who states that this 'has been suggested in various places' and cites one example from Bela Balassa (1967, pp. 160-161) .
36. See, in this regard, the excellent pamphlet by C. Fred Bergsten (1974) . Bergsten does not consider VERs or market-disruption problems in this study.
37. For long-standing restraints such as the Textiles Arrangement, it may be politically easier and also quite sensible to have the penalty enacted at the time of the next renewal, since there has been a short time limit on each such Arrangement. cease, whereas the proposed compensation here is when exports have alreudy ceased (or been reduced) and the compensation is for the adjustment that has to occur with the decline in exports. This difference, of course, stems from the fact that the case deals with trade in a bad, rather than a good, and hence with illegal trade that was sought to be eliminated at source through banning the production activity itself. Its similarity, however, with the proposed compensation for export market disruption (for goods) consists in the fact that the importing country provided the compensation to the farmers in the exporting country for the adjustment necessary if the heroin trade was to be curtailed. Hence, a brief account and review of the salient features of the case of the Turkish poppy and the US adjustment assistance is relevant and follows in the rest of this Appendix.
The US had been putting pressure on Turkey to reduce poppy cultivation for a long time. In response to this pressure, the number of provinces in which cultivation was legal was reduced from 42 (out of 70) in 1960 to 7 in 1970, and 4 in 1971.' On 30 June 1971, the US and Turkey announced a total ban on poppy cultivation.
On 14 February 1974, Turkey unilaterally lifted the ban.
The logistics of the poppy trade before the ban were as follows. By a simple process poppies can be turned to opium gum, which can in turn be manufactured into morphine base. Turkey produced around 120,000 kg of opium gum per yr. Legally, all of this was supposed to be sold to a state marketing agency, at $13 a kilo. But about half of the crop went on the black market, selling at around $35 a kilo. (Refined into morphine base -a cheap process -this became $550-$600 a kilo in Marseilles.) ' The agreement to ban cultivation called for US payments of $15 million a year, plus $20 million for agricultural development Investments in the affected regions. This was to compensate the farmers, and also the Turkish government, for the $3.5 million a year it earned from morphine export. The Turkish marketing organization was to pay farmers a compensation of $40 per kilo for poppies not grown.3
For more than a year after the ban, there was little impact on the flow of heroin, as dealers drew down their stockpiles.4 But eventually the ban had a major effect, doubling heroin prices in the US.
The ban was unpopular with farmers, and but will extend it to a two-period framework in Section I-IV. In Section III, we will also introduce adjustment costs, beginning with a simple formulation which has putty in period 1 and clay in period 2.' Thus, consider a 2-commodity model of international trade. We then assume a 2-period time horizon such that the level of exports E in the first period affects the probability P(E) of a quota ?? being imposed at the beginning of the next period.2 Let CJIC1, C2 ] be the standard social utility function defined in terms of the consumption Ci of commodity i (i = 1,2). By assumption, it is known at the beginning of the next period whether the quota E has been imposed or not. Thus, the policy in the next period will be to maximize U subject to the transformation function F[X, ,X2] = 0 and the terms of trade function n if no quota is imposed and with an additional constraint E < ?? if the quota is imposed.
Let now the maximal welfare with and without the quota be u and grespectively.
Clearly then, we have d> y when the quota is binding.
The expected welfare in the second period is then clearly:
The objective function for the first period therefore is:
where p is the discount factor. This is then to be maximized subject to the domestic transformation constraint, F[Xi ,Xz I = 0. In doing this, assume that P(E) is convex function of E, i.e. the probability of a quota being imposed increases, at an increasing rate as E is increased, and that, in the case where n depends on E, nE is concave in E. Then, the first-order conditions for an interior maximum are:
Now, Equations (1) and (2) yield the familiar result that the marginal rate of substitution in consumption equals the marginal rate of transformation.
Equation (3) moreover can be written as:
If (A) monopoly power is absent (n' = 0) and if (B) the first period's exports do not affect the probability of a quota being imposed in the second period, then (3') clearly reduces to the standard condition that the marginal rate of substitution in consumption equals the (average = marginal) terms of trade. If (A) does not hold but (B) holds, then *equals the marginal terms of trade (n + rr'E), leading to the familar optimum tariff. If both A and B are present, there is an additional tariff element:
This term can be explained as follows: if an additional unit of exports takes place in period 1, the probability of a quota being imposed and hence a discounted loss in welfare of p(u -a occurring, increases by P'(E). Thus, at the margin, the expected loss in welfare is p( &' -u)P '(E) since there is no loss in welfare if the quota is not imposed. Converted to numeraire terms, this equals P(U -YV"W)
.?
and must be subtracted from the marginal terms of trade (n + n'E), the effect of an additional unit of exports on the quantum of imports3
It is then clear that the market-disruptioninduced QR-possibility requires optimal intervention in the form of a tariff (in period 1). It is also clear that, compared to the optimal situation without such a QR-possibility, the resource allocation in the QR-possibility case will shift against exportable production: i.e. comparative advantage, in the welfare sense, shifts away, at the margin, from exportable production. Moreover, denoting the utility level under the optimal polic . quota possibility as $J$~<, . %et?rerrr?~nla~~ faire with the quota possibrhty as ti , and that under laissez faire without this quot P possibility as@%@ we can argue that This result is set out, with the attendant periodwise utility levels achieved under each option, in Table 1 which is self-explanatory.4
For the case of a small country, with no monopoly power in trade (except for the quota possibility), the equilibria under alternative policies are illustrated in Figure 1 .' Thus, r represents the utility level in the absence of a quota, y the utility level when the quota is (3) U* is utility level with optimal policy intervention when quota can be imposed in second period. (4)&F) is the probability of second-period quota of & being imposed, as a function of the first-period exports, E. With optimal policy intervention in the situation with possible quota, the exports of the first period result in a value of P* for P(E). With laissez faire, the exports in the first period will be different and the corresponding value for P(E) is p. (5) i.e. the loss in expected welfare that follows, in the absence of optimal intervention by the exporting country, from the QR-possibility. This measure clearly is: pP (u -y) and is, of course, nothing but the expected loss in period-2 from the possible imposition of the quota, duly discounted. Now, it is also clear that this measure will lie between the ex-post period-2 loss if the quota is invoked (which loss, duly discounted, is p(u -y)) and the ex-post period-2 loss if the quota is not invoked (which loss is, of course, zero). i.e., we were essentially dealing with a putty model.
_ aiqx, 4, x2+d3
However, this procedure eliminates an Uj -and important aspect of the problem raised by aXj market disruption. So, in this section, we x = the Lagrangean multiplier associated with modify our model and analysis to allow for the constraint, adjustment costs. However, to simplify the analysis, we take initially the extreme polar F(Xr ,X2) = 0. case of a putty-clay model, where the production choice made in period 1 cannot be The interpretation of these first-order modified in any way in period 2. conditions is straightforward. Condition (7) With this modification, the choice variables states that, given the optimal production levels, now are: Xi, the production of commodity i in the level of exports in period 2 when no quota periods 1 and 2 (i = 1,2); El, the net exports of is imposed must be such as to equate the commodity 1 in period 1; and Ez, the net marginal rate of substitution in consumption to exports of commodity 1 in period 2 when no the marginal terms of trade. Condition (6) is quota is imposed. As before, .??is the net export identical in form to the one obtained earlier: of commodity 1 when the quota is imposed. the optimal exports in period 1 must not Superscripts refer to periods 1 and 2.
equate the marginal rate of substitution in con-sumption in that period to the marginal terms of trade, but must instead also allow for the marginal change in expected welfare arising out of the change in probability of a quota being imposed: the latter equals P'(El) (u2 -Y2) where u2 = U[X, -Ez, X2 + nEz I and Y2 = UIXI -E, X2 + nE]. Thus, condition (6) ensures the optimal choice of exports in period 1, given the production levels. Conditions (4) and (5) then relate to the optimal choice of production levels and, as we would expect, the introduction of adjustment costs does make a difference. Writing (4) and (5) in the familiar ratio form, we get: t;l= q +P%wL!~ +P{l-P(&))Cr:
Clearly therefore the marginal rate of transformation in production (in periods 1 and 2, identically, as production in period 1 will carry over into period 2 by assumption), i.e. F1 lF2, must not equal the marginal rate of substitution in consumption in period 1, i.e. U; /Vi, (unlike our earlier analysis without adjustment costs in Sections I and II). Rather, FI/F2 should equal a term which properly takes into account the fact that production choices once made in period 1 cannot be changed in period 2 to suit the state (i.e. the imposition or absence of a quota) obtaining in period 2. Equation (8) can be readily interpreted as follows.
The LHS is, of course, the marginal rate of transformation in production. The RHS represents the marginal rate of substitution in consumption, if re-interpreted in the following sense. Suppose that the output of commodity 1, the exportable, is increased by one unit in period 1 (and hence in period 2 as well, by assumption).
Given an optimal trade policy, then, the impact of this on welfare can be examined by adding it to consumption in each period. Thus social utility is increased in period 1 by Vi while in period 2 it will increase by e if no quota is imposed and by _CJ if the quota is imposed.
Thus, the discounted increase in period 2 welfare is given as: Thus, the total expected welfare impact of a unit increase in the production of commodity 1 is:
Similarly, a decrease in the production of commodity 2 by a unit in period 1 (and hence in period 2 as well) reduces expected welfare by:
Hence, the ratio of these two expressions, just derived, represents the 'true' marginal rate of substitution, and this indeed is the RHS in Equation (8) to which the marginal rate of transformation in production -F, /F2 , the LHS in Equation (8) -is to be equated for optimality.
The optimal policy interventions in this modified model with adjustment costs are immediately evident from Equations (6) - (8) and the preceding analysis. Thus, in period 1, the ratio U: /Uk is clearly the relative price of commodity 1 (in terms of commodity 2) facing consumers, while or is the average terms of trade. Thus CJ: /CJi differs from n(El) by and this difference constitutes a consumption tax on the importable, commodity 2. An identical difference between F, IF,, the relative price facing producers, and n(El) would define a production tax on commodity 2 at the same rate, so that a tariff at this rate would constitute the appropriate intervention in the model with no adjustment costs. However, with adjustment costs, Equation (8) defines, for period 1, the appropriate production tax-cumsubsidy which, in general, will diverge from the appropriate consumption tax: so that the optimal mix of policies in the model with adjustment costs will involve a tariff (reflecting both the monopoly power in trade and the QR possibility) plus a production tax-cum-subsidy in period 1 .6 In period 2, in both the models (with and without adjustment costs), an appropriate intervention in the form of a tariff (to exploit monopoly power) would be called for; however, with production fixed at period 1 levels in the adjustment-cost model, a consumption tax-cum-subsidy would equally suffice. Specifically, note that in period 2, with adjustment costs, the price ratio facing consumers would be q/o: if no quota is imposed, with the average terms of trade at 7r(E2 ) and the producers' price ratio (as defined along the putty-transformation frontier) would be F, /F2 ; on the other hand, if the quota is imposed, these values change to Y: /z, n(E) and F, IF2 respectively. The consumption taxcum-subsidy and the equivalent tariff (with no impact on production decision, already frozen at period 1 levels), are then defined by these divergences, depending on whether the quota obtains or not.
A tabular comparison of the characteristics of the optimal solution, with and without adjustment costs, is presented in Table 2 and should assist the reader.
Note that the above results are quite consistent with the basic propositions of the theory of distortions, as developed in BhagwatiRamaswami (1963 ), Johnson (1965 and Bhagwati (197 1) : the first-best, optimal policy intervention for the case with adjustment costs requires a trade policy to adjust for the foreign distortion (represented by the effect of current exports on the period 2 probability of a quota being invoked) and a production taxcumsubsidy to adjust for the existence of adjustment costs in production.
It also follows, from the equivalence propositions, that the combination of the optimal tariff and the optimal production tax-cum-subsidy can be reproduced identically by a tariff set at the 'net' production tax-cum-subsidy required by the optimal solution plus a consumption tax-cumsubsidy.
Similarly, while our analysis has been focused on first-best policy intervention, the fundamental results of the theory of distortions and welfare on second-best policies also can be immediately applied to our problem. Thus, if there are zero adjustment costs so that there is only the foreign distortion in period 1, then clearly a production tax-cumsubsidy will improve (but not maximize) welfare. Similarly, if there are adjustment costs as well, then there will be two distortions and then we would now have applicable here the Bhagwati-Ramaswami-Srinivasan (1969) proposition that no feasible, welfare-improving form of intervention may exist if both of the policy measures that wiJl secure optimal intervention cannot be used simultaneously. (DRT2 not relevant as production is frozen at period 1 levels) Notes: a. DRS, DRT and FRT represent the marginal rates of substitution in consumption, domestic transformation, and foreign transformation respectively. For an earlier use of these abbreviations see Bhagwati, Ramaswami and Srinivasan (1969) . Since we are considering an interior maximum, the inequalities do not include corner equilibria, of course. The subscripts refer to the periods, 1 and 2. NOTES 1. The full-length JIE paper also extends the analysis as to allow for varying levels of quota is noted later in to lesser rigidity and to steady state analysis. this section.
2. This method of introducing market disruption presupposes that the QR-level is prespecified but that the probability of its being imposed will be a function of how deeply the market is penetrated in the importing country and therefore how effective the import-competing industry's pressure for protection will be vis-his the importing country's government. The effect of modifying this simplifying assumption so 3. Instead of assuming that the fixed quota of E will be imposed with robability P(E), one could assume that a quota of %wiB be imposed with probability density P(r&). In other words, the quota level Fis variable and the probability of imposition depends both on the level ??and on the quantum of exports E in the first period. Let f(n denote the maximum of WC, ,C, 1 subject to F(X, ,X,) = 0 and E < E where C, = (X, -E, ) and C, = (X, + nE, ). Then the expected welfare in period 2, given the export level E in the first period, is ~foP@'$')d~ Let us denote this by h(E). Thus the maximand o now becomes U[X, -E, X, f HE] + ph(E) and condition (3') becomes lJ ph'@') $, = n+ n'E + U, Now h'(E) is the change in expected welfare in period 2 due to an additional unit of export in period 1 and this has to be added to the marginal terms of trade II + n'E. Nothing substantive therefore changes. Note however that if we allow for many exporting countries and if the share in the overall quota level granted in period 2 to one exporting country will increase with the export level achieved by that country in period 1, this would produce an incentive to increase, rather than decrease, the export level in period 1, ceteris paribus. Hence our analysis based on one exporting country would need to be modified correspondingly.
4. However, we cannot assert that okQ > or except in the case of a small country with no influence on the terms of trade; this follows from the fact that @hQ is no longer the first-best policy in the presence of monopoly power in trade, so that U* may well exceed uin Table 1. 5. Needless to say, for a country with no monopoly power, it is not meaningful to think of market disruption leading to QRs: if the country is indeed atomistic in foreign markets, its exports surely will not cause market disruption.
Our analysis, of course, allows for monopoly power; only Figure 1 illustrates the simple case of a small country.
6. It should be pointed out that atomistic fnrns in period 1 are assumed to respond to that period's prices only. This assumption can be justified on the ground that they are likely to assume that these prices will carry over into the next period, since there is no other obvious mechanism by which they can anticipate the 'true' period 2 prices.
